

DD/ST# 1629-64

**CONFIDENTIAL**

26 May 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT : OS/SRD Indices Conversion Project

REFERENCE : Memorandum for Assistant Director,  
Computer Services by Director of Security;  
same subject; dated 13 May 1964

1. OCS agrees to proceed on the SRD conversion project in accordance with the recommendations contained in the referenced memorandum.

2. In the interests of clarifying and implementing these recommendations, OCS submits the following comments:

- a. The OS employee to be assigned to Quarters Eye should be appointed and his duties and procedures delineated by OS. (Para. 2a of referenced memorandum.)
- b. The OS representative who will "monitor" this project should be assigned and his duties and procedures delineated by OS. --In this connection, it must be remembered that OCS machine processing may occur during any of the three daily shifts. (Para. 2b of referenced memorandum.)
- c. It is hoped by OCS that tapes containing the SRD Index will be stored on the shelves in the OCS tape vault where they will be protected not only by the vaulted area in which shelved but by special access procedures--per para. 6b(2) of the recently approved

|            |    |          |          |           |       |
|------------|----|----------|----------|-----------|-------|
| DOC        | 1  | REV DATE | 10-11-81 | BY        | 06159 |
| ORIG COMP  |    | OPI      | 31       | TYPE      | 01    |
| ORIG CLASS | 5  | PAGES    | 3        | REV CLASS | C     |
| JUST       | 22 | NEXT REV | 8017     | AUTH      | HR    |

Approved For Release 2000/06/13 : CIA-RDP78-04007A000800170001-5

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

**CONFIDENTIAL**

"Instructions for Special Compartmentation of Data Within OCS, DD/S&T." If storage in separate and discrete safes is decided upon, the safes may be either in OCS or in OS Headquarters space. If it is determined that the safes are to be placed in OCS space, at least three OCS persons authorized access to the project should be included among those having the combinations to such safes. (Para. 2c of referenced memorandum.)

- d. OCS has previously supplied OS with those OCS persons whose names should be included in the Project's Authorization List. OCS will undertake to update the OCS portion of this list as personnel changes warrant. (Para. 2d of referenced memorandum.)
- e. OS should furnish to OCS the OS portion of the Authorization List for this Project. (Para. 2e of referenced memorandum.)
- f. OCS will undertake to "erase" auxiliary tapes and memory-storage devices utilized in processing for this project. It may be that some adjustment to this procedure will be desired after a period of operating experience or after OCS places its computer operations under an automatic monitoring system. OCS will surface suggested changes in this "erasure" procedure if and when such changes seem warranted. For the present, however, OCS will follow this "erasure" procedure. (Para. 2f of referenced memorandum.)

3. As you know, OS has assumed the responsibility for recruiting temporary contract employees for editing and card punching the SRD index conversion. Although the editing staff is at work, recruitment of card punch personnel has proved very difficult. Accordingly, in the interests of getting some card punching started, the OS Project Officer [REDACTED]

25X1A9a

~~SECRET~~  
CONFIDENTIAL

25X1A9a

[REDACTED] has asked that OCS Card Punch Operators assist in the card punching task on a "time-available" basis. OCS agrees to provide such support. In this connection, however, two things merit mention: (1) vigorous OS recruitment efforts should continue in view of the fact that OCS card punch time-available will not be adequate to this large-scale conversion effort; and (2) OCS, in proceeding to render such support, will follow ad hoc security procedures pending clarification and formalization of final procedures by OS.

4. In further particularizing the security procedures for this project, OS may find it helpful to bear in mind the following:

- a. During the lengthy systems study conducted by the OCS-OS project team, it was found that very few individual index cards contained identifiable substantive information (and most of this could be purged or coded by the OS Editors).
- b. Normal OCS security measures, both procedural and physical, already provide an unusually high degree of security control in OCS.
- c. All OCS personnel have TOP SECRET, SI, and T/KH clearances as a common base...with additional clearances as required.
- d. Data stored in machine language, such as magnetic tapes, is, of course, much less accessible than human language files in that special equipment is required to interpret and read such language.

5. I suggest a mutual review of these procedures at the end of the fourth month of operations.

151

JOSEPH BECKER  
Assistant Director  
Computer Services

~~SECRET~~  
CONFIDENTIAL